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Herd Health

Is Aerosol Transmission an Important Risk for
PRRSV Transmission? An Example of How
Simple Biosecurity Procedures Can Prevent
Virus Spread Within a Barn1
B. R. Trible and R. R. R. Rowland2

Summary

Understanding the transmission of porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome
virus (PRRSV) is important for developing methods to control and eliminate the virus.
In this study, 2 similar experiments were performed involving 10 sentinel pigs maintained for 42 d in close proximity to 190 pigs experimentally infected with a highly
pathogenic PRRSV isolate. All pigs were monitored for PRRSV infection by PCR and
serology. In the first experiment, virus transmission to sentinel pigs was detected within
21 d after infection of the source population of pigs. In the second experiment, a small
separation distance of 27 ft combined with simple biosecurity procedures was sufficient
to prevent the transmission of virus to sentinel pigs. Overall, the results indicate a low
risk associated with PRRSV spread by aerosols and reinforce the importance of maintaining good biosecurity procedures.
Key words: PRRSV, aerosols

Introduction

Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) is responsible for significant losses to the swine industry. PRRSV infection affects all stages of production, causing reproductive failure in pregnant gilts or sows, respiratory disease and high mortality in nursery pigs, and decreased performance during finishing. Established routes
of virus spread include movement of infected pigs and the use of virus-contaminated
semen. A third route is through the introduction of virus by mechanical vectors, such
as contaminated equipment. A fourth route is termed area spread, which includes other
non-human associated transmission such as contaminated aerosols and other unknown
mechanisms. Experimental models of virus spread via aerosols have reported maximum
transmission distances ranging from 1.5 ft to 5.5 miles (Dee et al., 2010; Otake et al.,
2010)3,4; however, the results of experiments documenting distance of 3 and 5.5 miles
did not incorporate direct pig-to-pig transmission as the means of detecting infection
(Dee et al., 2006; Otake et al., 2010)5.
The work is supported by PRRS CAP, USDA NIFA Award 2008-55620-19132.
PRRS CAP Project Director, Department of Diagnostic Medicine and Pathobiology, Kansas State
University, Manhattan, KS 66506.
3
Dee S., S. Otake, and J. Deen. 2010. Use of a production region model to assess the efficacy of various air
filtration systems for preventing airborne transmission of porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome
virus and Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae: results from a 2-year study. Virus Res. 154:177-184.
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Otake S., S. Dee, C. Corzo, S. Oliveira, and J. Deen. 2010. Long-distance airborne transport of infectious PRRSV and Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae from a swine population infected with multiple viral
variants. Vet. Microbiol. 145:198-208.
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Dee S., J. Deen, J. Cano, L. Batista, and C. Pijoan. 2006. Further evaluation of alternative air-filtration
systems for reducing the transmission of Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus by aerosol.
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As part of a large study involving the infection of hundreds of pigs with a highly pathogenic PRRSV isolate, we sought to determine if implementing a few biosecurity procedures would prevent the aerial spread of PRRSV in a facility that possessed some of the
features found in commercial production settings.

Procedures

Animal experiments were initiated after review and approval by the Kansas State
University Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. For each experiment, ~200
high-health pigs were randomly distributed at a density of 10 to 15 pigs per pen (12 ft
by 12 ft). A diagram of the facility is shown in Figure 1A. Each pen consisted of a solid
concrete floor separated by either solid concrete partitions or metal-framed partitions
covered by hard plastic. A metal-framed gate was located at the front of each pen to
allow access for personnel while keeping the pens relatively open. Pens were washed
daily by animal caretakers and effluent material was allowed to flow out the front of
each pen into a central floor drain (Figure 1A).
The virus challenge consisted of 105 50% tissue culture infectious doses of the PRRSV
isolate NVSL 97-7895. This isolate was selected based on its relatively high pathogenic
properties (Willis et al., 19976). Half of the 3 mL virus inoculum was administered
intranasally and the remainder was given intramuscularly. Pigs were monitored daily
for clinical signs and received appropriate veterinary care as needed. Experiments were
terminated 42 d after infection.
Blood samples were collected from all pigs on d 0, 4, 7, 11, 14, 21, 28, 35, and 42 postinfection. Animal care and scientific personnel donned protective equipment, including disposable Tyvek coveralls, nitrile gloves, and foot covers. A footbath filled with
disinfectant (Trifectant; Alpha Tech Pet, Littleton, MA) was placed in the walkway
for workers to clean boots before entering or leaving animal areas. PRRSV diagnostic
assays, including PCR and ELISA, were performed by personnel at the Kansas State
Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory.

Results

Experiment 1. For the first experiment, biosecurity procedures included a one-way flow
of personnel from the clean area to the infected area (Figure 1B). Personnel entered
through a single door, donned protective gear, then worked with the sentinel pigs prior
to entering the infected pig area. The experimentally challenged pigs exhibited clinical signs, including lethargy and respiratory distress, which first appeared within 1 wk
after challenge. Infection was confirmed by PRRSV qRT-PCR, with the first positive
results appearing on d 4 postinfection and positive serology beginning on d 14 (Figure
2A, Table 1). The sentinel pigs became PRRSV-positive on d 21 (6 out of 10 pigs were
PCR-positive) followed by seroconversion on d 35. By the end of the study, all sentinel pigs were PCR- and antibody-positive for PRRSV. The results from Experiment
1 demonstrated that PRRSV NVSL 97-7895 was transmitted between infected and
sentinel pigs. Transmission likely occurred during peak levels of viremia in the viruschallenged pigs. The transmission of virus to sentinel pigs was not the result of direct
Can. J. Vet. Res. 70:168-175.
6
Willis R., J. Zimmerman, S. Swenson, K. Yoon, H. Hill, D. Bundy, and M. McGinley. 1997. Transmission of PRRSV by direct, close, or indirect contact. Swine Health Prod. 213-218.
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pig-to-pig contact, but could have occurred through the aerosol spread of virus, either
by virus released into the air by infected pigs or by droplets generated during the washing of pens. Other possibilities included the movement of personnel or contaminated
materials from the infected area, back through the gate, and into the clean area.
Experiment 2. Experiment 2 was performed in the same manner as Experiment 1, with
the exception of three changes in biosecurity (Figure 1C). The first was an increase in
separation from 17 ft to 27 ft between sentinel pigs and the nearest infected pen. The
second change was the replacement of the gate with a barrier fence to prevent the movement of personnel between clean and infected areas. Finally, the clean and infected areas
had separate personnel entrances and exits. The infection and immune response of the
challenge pigs followed the same course as Experiment 1 (see Figure 2B and Table 1).
In this experiment, the sentinel pigs remained PRRSV PCR-negative and seronegative
throughout the 42-d exposure to the infected pigs (Figure 2B, Table 1).

Discussion

The model used in this study incorporates several features relevant for understanding
mechanisms of aerosol transmission, including (1) a large source population infected
with a highly pathogenic PRRSV isolate, (2) the placement of sentinel pigs and infected
pigs within the same facility that shared the same air space, and (3) the exposure of
sentinel pigs for an extended period of time. The results from this study indicate that
the risk of the spread of PRRSV via aerosols is likely minimal and supports the observations and conclusions of several previous studies showing that aerosol spread of PRRSV
is limited to a couple of meters. This is in contrast to recent reports indicating that
isolates such as MN-184 can spread via aerosols over distances of several miles. The
PRRSV isolate used in this study shares characteristics similar to MN-184 in terms of
pathogenicity and the capacity to replicate to high titers within pigs (Johnson et al.,
2004; Osorio, et al., 2002; Troung et al., 2004).7,8,9 MN-184 was reported to travel up
to 9.1 km from the source of the virus, which was 300 experimentally infected pigs
(Otake et al., 2010), whereas in this study, 190 pigs infected with NVSL 97-7895 were
unable to infect pigs at a distance of approximately 27 ft. The reason for this discrepancy is unclear. One possibility is related to the method used to determine virus spread.
In this study, pig-to-pig transmission was used as the indicator of aerosol spread. In
contrast, the spread of MN-184 was measured by assaying the contents of concentrated
air samples collected at various distances from the source population. Although infectious virus particles were identified by virus isolation and swine bioassays, whether these
methods accurately replicate the conditions of pig-to-pig aerosol transmission found in
the field is unknown.

Johnson W., M. Roof, E. Vaughn, J. Christopher-Hennings, C. R. Johnson, and M. Murtaugh. 2004.
Pathogenic and humoral immune responses to porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus
(PRRSV) are related to viral load in acute infection. Vet. Immunol. Immunopathol. 102:233-247.
8
Osorio F., J. Galeota, E. Nelson, B. Brodersen, A. Doster, R. Wills, F. Zuckermann, and W. Laegreid.
2002. Passive transfer of virus-specific antibodies confers protection against reproductive failure induced
by a virulent strain of porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus and establishes sterilizing
immunity. Virology 302:9-20.
9
Truong H., Z. Lu, G. Kutish, J. Galeota, F. Osorio, and A. K. Pattnaik. 2004. A highly pathogenic
porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus generated from an infectious cDNA clone retains
the in vivo virulence and transmissibility properties of the parental virus. Virology 325:308-319.
7
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Although the transmission of PRRSV in aerosols was not seen in this study, we cannot
conclude that area spread never occurs; however, our results indicate that simple
changes in biosecurity procedures, including the redirection of personnel flow and a
relatively small distance between infected and non-infected pigs, reduced PRRSV transmission risk within an experimental facility.
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Figure 1. Layout of the PRRSV challenge facility used to house the experimentally
infected and sentinel pigs.
A shows the general layout of the facility including dimensions and location of the central floor
drain. The flow of personnel; the location of gates, barriers, entrances and exits; and the areas
designated as clean and infected are shown in B (Experiment 1) and C (Experiment 2). For B
and C, the gray and white areas denote infected and clean areas, respectively. Pigs were located
in numbered pens. The sentinel pigs were placed in pen 1.
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Figure 2. PRRSV load in reference and infected pig sera.
Quantitative RT-PCR was performed as described in Procedures. The average of the log10 of
PRRSV templates per reaction for infected and sentinel pigs is shown for Experiment 1 (A)
and Experiment 2 (B). Filled circles and non-filled circles show the means for infected pigs and
sentinel pigs in each panel, respectively. Standard deviations are represented by horizontal and
vertical lines within each panel.
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Table 1. Serum antibody levels against PRRSV as detected by ELISA
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
Days postinfection
Days postinfection
Group
Pig ID
35
45
Pig ID
35
42
1
3
Sentinel pigs (pen 1)
1358
0.65
2.75
6605
-0.06
-0.04
1412
1.39
1.78
6639
-0.06
-0.05
1388
0.08
0.68
6662
-0.05
-0.06
1359
0.01
1.59
6663
-0.04
-0.05
1343
1.79
2.50
6707
-0.06
-0.06
1413
2.31
1.15
6739
-0.01
-0.02
1512
0.14
0.43
6749
-0.06
-0.03
1362
0.04
2.09
6758
-0.06
-0.06
1497
0.04
1.50
6761
-0.06
-0.06
1433
1.79
1.17
6773
-0.05
-0.04
2
Infected pigs
Mean
2.31
2.15
Mean
2.26
2.03
Includes all pigs in the sentinel group.
Includes the mean sample to positive ratio (S/P) for all pigs in the infected group (approximately 200 pigs).
3
Values indicate S/P of the PRRS ELISA. Shaded numbers indicate a positive result (S/P > 0.39).
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